Last week, we began our review of the Court’s experience with governmental entities.  This week, we’re evaluating governmental entities’ winning percentage.

Petitioners won 85.71% of their cases in 1994, 59.09% in 1995 and 100% in 1996.   Petitioners won 85.71% in 1997, 64.29% in 1998, 57.14% in 1999 and 71.43% in 2000.

In 2001, petitioners won 57.14% of the Court’s decisions.  Petitioners accounted for 88.89% in 2002 and 2004, and 80% in 2003.

We review governmental entity respondents from 1994 to 2004 in Table 313.  Half of the Court’s governmental entity respondents prevailed in 1994.  Two-thirds prevailed in 1995, 37.5% won in 1996, 71.43% won in 1997.  Two-thirds won in 1998, 40% in 1999, 42.86% in 2000 and one-quarter in 2001.  In 2002, 57.14% of governmental entity respondents prevailed.  In 2003, one-third of respondents won, and in 2004, 36.36% did.

In Table 314, we report government entity appellants’ winning percentage for the years 2005 through 2016.  Government entity appellants won only 28.57% of their cases in 2005.  Appellants won three-quarters of the time in 2006, 80% in 2007, 77.78% in 2008, and 100% in 2009.  In 2011, government entity appellants won three quarters of the time.  Appellants won 100% of their cases in 2012, but none in 2013 and 100% again in 2014.  Government entity appellants won two-thirds of their cases in 2015 and 77.78% in 2016.

In 2005, government entity respondents won 44.44% of their cases.  In 2006, respondents won 47.83%.  Government entity respondents won 70% in 2007 and half in 2008 and 2009.  In 2010, government entity respondents won 57.14% of their cases.  In 2011, government entity respondents won only 28.57% of their cases.  In 2012, government entity respondents won 83.33%.  Government entity respondents won half their cases in 2013, two-thirds in 2014, 46.67% in 2015, but only 20% in 2016.

Join us back here next Thursday as we turn our attention to the Court’s criminal docket.

Image courtesy of Flickr by Owen Allen (no changes).

For the past several weeks, we’ve looked at the Court’s record with death penalty appeals.  This week and next, we’re looking at the Court’s record with parties that are governmental entities.

In Table 308, we report the year-by-year data for governmental entity petitioners, beginning in 1994.  The numbers have varied widely.  The Court decided seven cases involving governmental entity petitioners in 1994, 22 in 1995, seven in 1996 and 14 each in 1997 and 1998.  The court decided seven cases each involving governmental petitioners in 1999 and 2000, fourteen in 2001, nine in 2002, five in 2003 and nine in 2004.

The data for petitioners in the years 2005 through 2016 are reported in Table 309.  The Court decided seven cases involving governmental entity petitioners in 2005, eight in 2006 and ten in 2007.  The Court decided nine such cases in 2008, six in 2009, nine in 2010, four in 2011 and six in 2012.  The Court decided only two cases involving governmental entity petitioners in 2013 and 2014 and three in 2015, but the Court’s total increased to nine in 2016.

We track the Court’s year by year totals of governmental entity respondents in Table 310.  The Court decided ten cases involving governmental entities as respondents in 1994, nine in 1995, eight in 1996 and seven in 1997.  The Court decided twelve such cases in 1998, ten in 1999, seven in 2000, eight in 2001 and seven in 2002.  The Court decided a dozen cases involving governmental entity petitioners in 2003 and eleven such cases in 2004.

The Court decided nine cases involving governmental entity respondents in 2005.  That number increased to twenty-three in 2006, but was back down to ten in 2007, six in 2008 and ten in 2009.  The Court decided seven such cases each in 2010 and 2011, six in 2012 and eight in 2013.  The Court only decided three cases involving governmental entity respondents in 2014, but decided fifteen in 2015.  The Court’s total was back down to five in 2016.

Join us back here tomorrow as we look at governmental entities’ winning percentage in civil cases.

Image courtesy of Flickr by Ray_LAC (no changes).

 

Yesterday, we reviewed the individual Justices’ voting records in death penalty appeals for the years 1994 through 2005.  Today, we look at the second half of our study period, 2006 through 2017.

In Table 303, we report the percentage of each Justice’s votes in death penalty cases which were to affirm or to reverse in part while affirming the sentence for the years 2006 through 2011.  No one topped ninety percent during these years in votes to affirm, as Chief Justice Lucas and Justice Arabian both did for the first six years we studied (based on comparatively few votes for each).  Five permanent Justices were between eighty and ninety percent affirmances – Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye (85.71%), Justices Baxter (84.51%), Chin (84.4%) and Corrigan (84.06%), and Chief Justice George (82.76%).  Three more voted to affirm between seventy and eighty percent of the time – Justice Werdegar (79.58%), Justice Moreno (77.97%) and Justice Kennard (77.46%).  Justice Liu, who joined the Court in the final year of this six year period, voted to affirm in half the death penalty cases he participated in.  Pro tem Justices voted to affirm 83.33% of the time.

Votes to reverse in part while affirming the sentence were also more common that they had been earlier.  Every Justice but one – Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye – voted to reverse in part while affirming the sentence in at least 10% of cases.  Justice Liu voted that way 25% of the time.  Justice Kennard did 13.38% of the time.  Justice Moreno cast such votes 12.71% of the time.  Chief Justice George (12.07%), Justice Chin (11.35%), Justices Werdegar and Baxter (11.27% each) and Justice Corrigan were next (10.87%).

In Table 304, we review the Justices’ votes to overturn death sentences between 2006 and 2011 – both reversing in part with the sentence vacated, and outright reversals.  Pro tem Justices were the most frequent votes to reverse in part and vacate the sentence, casting such votes in 8.33% of their cases.  Justice Moreno was next at 5.93%, followed by Justices Kennard and Werdegar (4.93% each), Chief Justice George (3.45%), and Justices Corrigan, Chin and Baxter (2.17%, 2.13% and 2.11%, respectively).  Although he participated in far fewer cases than the others, joining the Court in the final year of our six year period, Justice Liu led in reversals, voting to reverse 25% of the time.  Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye was next among the permanent Justices, voting to reverse in 4.76% of cases.  Justices Kennard and Werdegar both voted to reverse 4.23% of the time.  Justice Moreno was next at 3.39%, followed by Justices Corrigan, Chin and Baxter (2.9%, 2.13% and 2.11%, respectively) and Chief Justice George (1.72%).

In Table 305, we report the first half of the data for the years 2012-2017.  During these years, the Court added two additional Democratic appointees, and the data clearly reflects the shift.  Votes to affirm in full were about ten percentage points less common across the board.  Justice Kennard was the most frequent vote to affirm at 75.47%.  Justice Baxter voted to affirm 74.24% of the time, and Justice Chin did in 70.43% of his cases.  Justice Corrigan voted to affirm 69.3% of the time, and Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye did in 68.7%.  Justice Werdegar voted to affirm in 64.91% of her cases, and Justice Liu did in 60.18%.  The two least frequent votes to affirm in full were the two newest Justices – Justice Kruger (57.45%) and Justice Cuellar (53.19%).  Even pro tems were down substantially in votes to affirm – pro tems only voted to affirm in 55.56% of their cases.

The most frequent vote to reverse in part while affirming the sentence among the permanent Justices was Justice Cuellar, who cast such votes in 23.4% of his death penalty cases.  Justices Kruger and Liu were next at 21.28% and 20.35%, respectively.  The Republican nominees were up in this category during these years too.  Justices Corrigan and Werdegar voted to reverse in part affirming the sentence 19.3% of the time.  Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye did 19.3% of the time.  Next were Justice Chin (18.26%), Justice Baxter (16.67%) and Justice Kennard (15.09%).  Pro tem Justices voted to reverse in part affirming the sentence in 22.22% of their cases.

In Table 306, we report each Justice’s frequency of voting to reverse in part with the sentence vacated, and to reverse outright.  Justice Kruger was the most frequent vote to reverse in part at 17.02%.  Justices Cuellar and Liu were next at 14.89% and 14.16%.  Justice Werdegar voted to reverse in part in 10.53% of her cases.  Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye did so in 8.7%, Justice Corrigan in 7.89%, Justice Chin in 7.83%, and Justice Baxter in 6.06%.  Justice Kennard was the least frequent vote to reverse in part at 5.66%.

Justice Cuellar was the most frequent vote to reverse outright, voting that way in 8.51% of death penalty cases he participated in.  Justices Liu and Werdegar were next (5.31% and 5.26%, respectively).  Justice Kruger voted to reverse in 4.25% of cases. Justices Kennard and Corrigan were next (3.77% and 3.51%), followed by Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justice Chin (3.48 each) and Justice Baxter (3.03%).

In Table 307, we mix and match the data for the last two periods – 2006 to 2011 and 2012 to 2017 – to better illustrate a noteworthy trend.  Students of appellate decision-making have written extensively about “panel effects” for many years – the phenomenon of judges voting differently based upon who else is on the same panel (i.e., conservative Justices vote more liberally when sitting with liberals, and more conservatively when sitting with conservatives, and vice versa).  Indeed, political scientists have written about the phenomenon as a more basic tenet of group decision theory (as in, voters being polled when surrounded by people who either agree with their attitudes, or don’t).

We report the fraction of cases each Republican nominee has voted to reverse in part with the sentence vacated and to reverse outright in the years 2006 through 2011, compared to the years 2012 through 2017.  The data shows clear evidence of a panel effect.  For example, in the years 2006 through 2011, Justice Corrigan reversed in part in 2.17% of her cases and reversed outright 2.9% of the time.  For the years 2012 through 2017, she voted to reverse in part in 7.89% of cases, and to reverse 3.51% of the time.  Justice Werdegar’s numbers were up significantly too.  For the years 2006 to 2011, she averaged a partial reversal every 4.93% of the time, and an outright reversal every 4.23% of the time.  For the years 2012 through 2017, she reversed in part 10.53% of the time, and reversed outright in 5.26%.

Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye didn’t reverse in part in any case between 2006 and 2011.  She reversed in part in 8.7% of cases between 2012 and 2017.  She voted to reverse outright in 4.76% of cases between 2006 and 2011, and to reverse in 3.48% of her cases from 2012 on.  Justice Chin reversed in part and reversed outright in the same fraction of cases between 2006 and 2011 – 2.13%.  Between 2012 and 2017, Justice Chin reversed in part in 7.83% of his cases, and reversed outright 3.48% of the time.  Justice Baxter reversed in part and reversed outright 2.11% of the time for the years 2006 through 2011.  For the years 2012 through 2017, he reversed in part in 6.06% of cases, and reversed outright 3.03% of the time.

Join us back here next Thursday as we turn our attention to a new subject in our ongoing study of the California Supreme Court’s decision making.

Image courtesy of Flickr by    (no changes).

Last week, we looked at how often the Justices voted with the majority in death penalty appeals, regardless of whether the decision was to affirm, reverse in part while affirming the sentence, reverse in part and vacate the sentence, or reverse outright.  This week, we’re looking at the Justices’ votes themselves.

In Table 555, we report the percentage of each Justice’s votes in death penalty cases between 1994 and 1999 which were either to affirm entirely, or reverse in part while affirming the sentence.  The most frequent vote to affirm during these years was Chief Justice Lucas, who voted to affirm in 95.83% of his death penalty cases.  Justice Arabian was next at 91.67%.  Four Justices voted to affirm between eighty and ninety percent of the time – Chief Justice George (85.48%) and Justices Baxter (83.87%), Brown (83.33%) and Chin (81.58%).  Two more were between seventy and eighty percent – Justices Werdegar (79.66%) and Kennard (73.02%).  That leaves the least frequent votes to affirm entirely, which were Justice Mosk (64.52%) and pro tem Justices sitting by designation (50%, in a very small sample).

Votes to reverse in part while affirming the sentence were relatively rare during these years.  Only one permanent Justice voted that way more than ten percent of the time – Justice Chin, 10.53%.  Justice Baxter was next at 9.68%.  Three Justices were between eight and nine percent – Justice Werdegar (8.47%), Justice Brown (8.33%) and Chief Justice George (8.06%).  Three Justices cast such votes in less than five percent of their cases – Justice Mosk (4.84%), Chief Justice Lucas (4.17%) and Justice Arabian (4.17%).  Pro tems voted to reverse in part and affirm the sentence in 25% of their very small sample of cases.

We report votes to reverse in part while vacating the sentence and to reverse outright in Table 556.  Not surprisingly, Justice Mosk led in both categories, voting to reverse in part and overturn the death sentence in 16.13% of his cases, and to reverse outright in another 14.52%.  Justice Kennard was next, voting to reverse in part in 7.94% of her cases, and to reverse outright in another 9.52%.  The remaining Justices seldom voted to disturb death sentences during these years.  Justice Arabian voted to reverse in part in 4.17% of the limited number of death sentence cases he participated in at the beginning of our perioc.  Justices Werdegar and Baxter and Chief Justice George all voted to reverse in part in between three and four percent of their cases (3.39%, 3.23% and 3.23%, respectively).  Justices Brown and Chin both voted to reverse in part in less than three percent of their cases (2.78% and 2.63%).  After Justice Kennard, Justice Werdegar was the next most likely vote to reverse outright, voting to reverse in 8.47% of her death penalty cases.  Justice Brown voted to reverse 5.55% of the time, Justice Chin 5.26%, and Chief Justice George and Justice Baxter 3.23% each.  Chief Justice Lucas and Justice Arabian cast no votes to reverse outright during their limited time on the Court at the outset of these years.

Reversals appear to have edged up at least slightly during the years 2000 through 2005.  No Justice voted to affirm in ninety percent or more of his or her cases.  Seven voted to affirm between eighty and ninety percent of the time – Justices Baxter (86.92%), Chin (85.98%), Brown (85.87%), and Werdegar (85.05%), Chief Justice George (83.81%), Justice Moreno (80.25%), and pro tem Justices sitting by designation (85.71%).  Justice Kennard voted to affirm in 77.57% of death penalty appeals, and Justice Mosk did so 72.22% of the time.  Justice Moreno was the most frequent vote to reverse in part while affirming the sentence, voting that way in 7.41% of his cases.  Four Justices were between six and seven percent – Chief Justice George (6.67%) and Justices Werdegar, Chin and Baxter (6.54% each).  Justice Kennard voted to reverse in part with sentence affirmed in 5.61% of her cases.  Justice Mosk did so 5.56% of the time, and Justice Brown 5.43%.

Three permanent Justices voted to reverse in part and vacate the death sentence in more than 10% of their death penalty appeals – Justices Mosk (22.22%), Kennard (13.08%) and Moreno (11.11%).  Pro tem Justices voted that way in 14.29% of their cases.  Chief Justice George voted to reverse in part with sentence vacated in 7.62% of his cases.  Justice Brown was just behind at 7.61%.  Justice Werdegar voted that way in 7.48% of her cases.  Justices Chin and Baxter cast the fewest such votes – 6.54% and 5.61%, respectively.  Outright reversals, however, remained quite rare.  Justice Kennard voted to reverse 3.74% of the time.  Chief Justice George voted to reverse in 1.9% of his cases, Justice Moreno did so in 1.23% of his, and Justice Brown voted to reverse in 1.09%.  Justices Werdegar, Chin and Baxter each voted to reverse in only 0.93% of their death penalty appeals.  Justice Mosk and pro tem Justices case no votes to reverse outright during these years.

Join us back here tomorrow as we turn our attention to the years 2006 to 2017.

Image courtesy of Flickr by Tomosius (no changes).

Yesterday, we began our review of the individual Justices’ voting records in death penalty cases, discussing the data on the percentage of the time each Justice voted with the majority in death penalty appeals for the years 1994 through 2005.  Today, we address the second half of our study period, 2006 through 2017.

Incredibly, for the years 2006 through 2011, four members of the Court – Chief Justice George (116 cases), his successor Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye (21 cases), and Justices Corrigan (138 cases) and Liu (4 cases) voted with the majority in 100% of the death penalty appeals in which they participated.  Justice Baxter was in the minority only twice in 142 cases – 98.59%.  Justice Chin also was in the minority only twice in 141 cases – 98.58%.  Justice Werdegar voted with the majority in 95.8% of her 143 cases and Justice Moreno 95.73% of the time (117 cases).  Pro Tem designees voted with the majority in 26 of 28 cases, for a percentage of 92.86%.

In Table 298, we report the data for the years 2012 to the present.  Justices Baxter and Kruger have voted with the majority in every death penalty case in which each Justice has participated.  Justice Kennard voted with the majority in 98.91% of her 92 cases during these years.  Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye voted with the majority in 97.46% of her 118 cases.  After voting with the majority in 117 consecutive cases stretching back to 2011, the Chief Justice dissented in part in August 2016 in People v. Grimes.  Justice Chin has voted with the majority in 97.39% of his 115 death penalty cases.  Justice Werdegar did so 95.65% of the time and Justice Corrigan 95.61%.  Justice Cuellar has voted with the majority in 44 of 47 death penalty cases, or 93.62%.  Justice Liu is the most frequent dissenter among the permanent Justices, having joined the majority in 104 of 114 cases, or 91.23%.  Designated pro tem Justices have voted with the majority in 89.47% of their 19 cases.

Join us back here next Thursday as we continue our analysis of the individual Justices’ voting patterns in death penalty cases.

Image courtesy of Flickr by Giuseppe Milo (no changes).

Earlier this week, we reviewed the data on the percentage of the time each Justice of the Illinois Supreme Court voted with the majority in death penalty cases.  Today and tomorrow, we’ll be reviewing the same measure for the California Supreme Court during the years 1994 through 2017.

We begin with the years 1994 through 1999.  For these years, Justice Arabian voted with the majority in all his death penalty decisions – 24 of 24.  Chief Justice George voted with the majority in 98.46% of his death penalty cases.  Justice Chin voted with the majority in 40 of his 41 death penalty cases – 97.56%.  Justice Baxter voted with the majority in 62 of 64 death penalty cases – 96.88%.  Chief Justice Lucas voted with the majority in 23 of 24 cases – 95.83%.  Justice Werdegar voted with the majority 95.16%.  Justice Brown did so 94.87% of the time.  Justice Kennard did 90.77% of the time.  Justice Mosk voted with the majority only 48 of his 65 cases – 73.86%.  Finally, pro tem Justices sitting by designation voted with the majority half the time – three of six cases.

In Table 296, we report the data for the years 2000 through 2005.  Designee Justices voted with the majority in all seven of their death penalty cases.  Justices Baxter and Werdegar both voted with the majority in 106 of 107 cases – 99.07%.  Justice Chin voted with the majority in 98.13% of his 107 cases.  Justice Janice Rogers Brown voted with the majority in 90 of her 92 cases – 97.83%.  Chief Justice George voted with the majority in 97.14% of his 105 cases.  Justice Moreno did so 96.3% of the time.  Justice Kennard did in 90.65% of her cases.  Once again, Justice Mosk dissented the most, voting with the majority in 83.33% of his 81 death penalty cases.

Join us back here tomorrow as we review the Justices’ voting records for the years 2006 through 2017.

Image courtesy of Flickr by Kevin Stanchfield (no changes).

Yesterday, we began our review of the Court’s majority opinions in death penalty appeals between 1994 and 2017, focusing on complete affirmances and partial reversals where the sentence was affirmed.  Today, we review the second half of our analysis: partial reversals where the sentence was vacated, and complete reversals.

In Table 291, we report the data on partial reversals where the sentence was vacated.  Justice Kennard wrote five majority opinions in such cases.  Chief Justice George and Justices Corrigan and Werdegar wrote three each, Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin and Moreno wrote two apiece, and Justices Kruger, Baxter, Cuellar and Liu have written one each.

We report the average length of majority opinions in partial reversals with the sentence vacated in Table 292.  Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye’s two majority opinions averaged 117.5 pages.  Chief Justice George’s three opinions averaged 80 pages.  Justice Liu averaged 78 pages, Justice Werdegar 70,33 pages, Justice Baxter 64, Justice Kruger 54, Justice Cuellar 53, Justice Chin 51.5, Justice Corrigan 50.67, Justice Kennard 44.6 and Justice Moreno 38 pages.

We report the Justice-by-Justice data for the Court’s eleven reversals in Table 293;  Justice Corrigan has written the majority opinion in four such cases.  Justices Werdegar and Baxter have written two and Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Brown and Kennard have written one apiece.

In Table 294, we report the average length of the Court’s outright reversals in death penalty cases.  Justice Werdegar’s majority opinions have averaged 69.5 pages.  Justice Kennard averaged 40 pages.  Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye has averaged 35 pages, Justice Baxter has averaged 31.5 pages, Justice Corrigan 16.75 pages, and Justice Brown’s majority opinions have averaged 12 pages.

Join us back here next Thursday as we turn to a new subject in our ongoing analysis of the California Supreme Court’s decision making.

Image courtesy of Flickr by Marc Cooper (no changes).

 

For the past few weeks, we’ve been reviewing the death penalty jurisprudence of the Illinois and California Supreme Courts on this blog and the Illinois Supreme Court Review.  This week, we’re reviewing the Court’s majority opinions.

In Table 287, we report the data on majority opinions in death penalty affirmances.  Justice Chin has written 51 majority opinions in death penalty affirmances.  Justice Werdegar has written 44, Justice Kennard 39, Justice Baxter 38, Chief Justice George 36, Justice Corrigan 28, Justice Moreno 25, Justice Brown and Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye 19 each, Justice Mosk 12 and Justice Liu 8.  Seven majority opinions have been per curiam.  Chief Justice Lucas wrote five majority opinion, Justice Arabian wrote 4, Justice Kruger has written 3 and Justice Cuellar has written two.

We discovered reviewing the Illinois Supreme Court’s experience with death penalty cases that cases in which the death penalty was vacated, whether partial or complete reversals, tended to be shorter than affirmances.  The result is the same in California.  The Court entirely affirmed in 340 death penalty cases between 1994 and 2017, averaging 76.594 pages.  The Court has partially reversed while affirming the sentence in 51 cases, with the majority opinions averaging 77.568 pages.  The Court has partially reversed with the sentence vacated in 24 cases, with the majority opinions averaging 62.042 pages.  Finally, the Court has entirely reversed in 11 cases.  The majority opinions averaged 32.36 pages.

In Table 288, we report the average length of majority opinions Justice-by-Justice in death penalty affirmances.  Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye wrote the longest opinions, averaging 102.58 pages.  Chief Justice George averaged 98.22 pages.  Justice Baxter averaged 95.658 pages.  Justice Liu has averaged 86.375 pages, Justice Mosk averaged 82.167 pages, Justice Werdegar 79.509, Justice Arabian 76 pages, Justice Moreno 71.32 pages, Justice Corrigan 67.07 pages, Justice Kruger 65 pages, Chief Justice Lucas 64 pages, Justice Kennard 63.64 pages, Justice Chin 62.373 pages, per curiam majority opinions have averaged 58.857 pages, Justice Brown averaged 57.947 pages, and Justice Cuellar has averaged 57.5 pages.

In Table 289, we report the Court’s majority opinions in death penalty cases where it partially reversed while affirming the sentence.  Justice Chin has led the Court since 1994, writing the majority opinion in eight such cases.  Justice Werdegar has written seven majorities, Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Kennard and Baxter wrote six, Justices Moreno and Liu have written four apiece, Chief Justice George wrote three majorities, Justices Brown and Corrigan have written two apiece, and Justices Cuellar and Mosk have written one each.  Finally, the Court released one per curiam majority opinion in such a case.

Majority opinions in partial reversals where the sentence was overall averaged almost exactly the same length as affirmances.  Justice Cuellar’s single majority opinion was 162 pages long.  Chief Justice George averaged 97 pages.  Justice Liu averaged 92.5 pages, Justice Kennard 82.33 pages, Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye 79.33 pages, Justice Baxter 78.5, Justice Chin 77, Justice Moreno 73.75, Justice Werdegar 73, Justice Brown 63, Justice Corrigan 50.5 pages and Justice Mosk 41 pages.  The Court’s sole per curiam opinion in this category was only two pages long.

Join us back here tomorrow as we continue our review of the Court’s death penalty jurisprudence.

Image courtesy of Flickr by Franco Folini (no changes).

Yesterday, we reviewed the data for the year-by-year numbers of mandatory death penalty appeals decided by the California Supreme Court.  Today, we review the overall affirmance rates, county by county.

For the entire period, the Court has decided 425 death penalty appeals.  The Court has affirmed 342 in all respects.  The Court has partially reversed while leaving the penalty intact in another 45, partially reversed vacating the penalty in 25 cases, and reversed outright in 12 cases.  This translates to an affirmance rate of 80.47%.  The Court has partially reversed 10.59% with the penalty affirmed, partially reversed with penalty reversed another 5.88%; and reversed in all respects 2.82% of the death penalty cases.

Eleven counties had at least one of their cases reversed in part (with the penalty vacated) or reversed outright: Los Angeles (83.7%); San Mateo (87.5%); Alameda (96.3%); Riverside (90.91%); Kern (93.33%); Orange (94.29%); Stanislaus (88.89%); Ventura (85.71%); Shasta (75%); Monterey (80%) and Contra Costa (85.71%).

A total of twenty-four counties have had one hundred  percent of their death penalty appeals either affirmed outright, or affirmed in part with the penalty upheld: Placer, Sacramento, Butte, Merced, San Diego, San Bernardino, Santa Clara, San Francisco, Santa Cruz, Calveras, El Dorado, Madera, Fresno, Kings, Tulare, San Luis Obispo, Sonoma, Humboldt, Solano, Santa Barbara, Napa, Lake, Marin and Tehana counties.

Join us back here tomorrow as we turn to another phase of our analysis of the Supreme Court’s decision making.

Image courtesy of Flickr by Chad McDonald (no changes).

This week, we’re continuing our comparative analysis of the death penalty appeal cases, both here and over at the Illinois Supreme Court Review.  The discussion is particularly timely for California given the Supreme Court’s decision largely upholding the controversial death penalty initiative adopted in November by the voters.  This week, we disaggregate the Court’s overall reversal rate for death penalty cases to look at how the cases have gone, county by county.  First, let’s review the distribution of death penalty cases from around the State.

In Table 282, we report the county by county data for the years 1994 through 1999.  In 1994, the Court decided three cases originating in Los Angeles, and one each from Placer, San Mateo, Alameda and  Riverside counties.  In 1995, the Court decided six cases from Los Angeles, two from Alameda County, and one each from Riverside, Kern, Stanislaus, Sacramento, Butte and Ventura counties.  In 1996, Sacramento County led with three cases.  Los Angeles, Riverside, Kern, Stanislaus and Merced counties produced one apiece.  In 1997, Los Angeles was back at the top with seven cases.  Sacramento produced two, and San Mateo, Kern, Orange, San Diego and San Bernardino counties produced one each.  In 1998, Los Angeles led with three cases and Sacramento had two.  Riverside, Kern, Orange, Butte, San Diego, Santa Clara and San Francisco produced one case each.  In 1999, six counties produced one case apiece: Los Angeles, Alameda, Riverside, San Diego, Santa Cruz and Calaveras.

In Table 283, we report the data for the years 2000 through 2005.  In 2000, five cases from Los Angeles County were decided.  The Court decided four cases from San Diego and one each from Alameda, Orange, San Bernardino, El Dorado, Shasta and Madera counties.  In 2001, the Court decided four death penalty cases from Los Angeles, two each from Riverside and Kern, and one apiece from Orange, Shasta and Fresno counties.  In 2002, the Court decided two cases each from Los Angeles, Alameda and Stanislaus counties and one each from San Mateo, Sacramento, Butte, San Diego, San Bernardino, San Francisco, Shasta and Monterey counties.  In 2003, the Court decided seven cases from Los Angeles, four from Riverside, two from Santa Clara, and one each from Alameda, Stanislaus, Sacramento, San Bernardino, Shasta, Contra Costa and El Dorado counties.  In 2004, the Court decided six death penalty cases from Los Angeles, three each from Orange and San Bernardino, two from Contra Costa, and one apiece from Alameda, Kern, Stanislaus, Sacramento, Shasta, Fresno and San Joaquin counties.  Finally, in 2005, the Court decided fourteen death penalty cases from Los Angeles, three from Alameda, two from Sacramento, and one each from San Mateo, Kern, Stanislaus, Ventura, San Diego and Fresno counties.

We report the data for the years 2006 through 2011 in Table 284 below.  In 2006, the Court decided five death penalty cases from Los Angeles, two each from San Mateo, Alameda, Orange and Santa Clara counties, and one apiece from Riverside, Kern, San Diego, Fresno and Kings counties.  In 2007, the Court decided six cases from Los Angeles, four from Orange, three each from Alameda, San Diego and San Bernardino, and one case apiece from Sacramento, Ventura, Contra Costa and Tulare counties.  In 2008, the Court decided nine cases from Los Angeles, three from Riverside, two each from Orange, San Bernardino and Fresno counties, and one each from Placer, San Mateo, Sacramento, Ventura, Tulare, San Luis Obispo, Sonoma and Humboldt counties.  In 2009, the Court decided five cases originating from Los Angeles County, four from Riverside, three from Alameda and Santa Clara, two from Orange, San Diego and Fresno counties, and one apiece from San Mateo, Kern, Sacramento, San Bernardino and San Joaquin counties.  In 2010, six cases were decided from Los Angeles County, three cases from Riverside, two each from Alameda, Orange,  Sacramento and San Bernardino counties, and one each to Kern, San Diego, Tulare, Solano and Santa Barbara counties.  In 2011, the Supreme Court decided eight cases from Los Angeles county, five from Riverside, three from San Diego, two from Fresno and Monterey, and one apiece from Alameda, Kern, Orange, Sacramento, San Bernardino and Sonoma counties.

In 2012, Los Angeles County produced eleven death penalty cases.  The Court decided three cases from Alameda County, two each from Riverside, Orange, San Diego and San Bernardino counties, and one apiece from Kern, Ventura and Napa counties.  In 2013, the Court decided seven death penalty cases originating in Los Angeles County, three from Orange County, two each from Riverside, Kern and Contra Costa counties, and one apiece from Stanislaus, San Diego, Monterey and Tulare counties.  In 2014, the Court decided eight cases from Los Angeles, four from Riverside, three from Orange, two from Ventura, and one case apiece from Sacramento, San Diego, Santa Clara, Santa Cruz, San Joaquin, Kings and Tulare counties.

In 2015, Riverside led with six death penalty cases.  The court decided three cases from Los Angeles, three from Orange and two from Shasta.  The Court decided one case each from Alameda, San Bernardino, Contra Costa and Lake counties.  In 2016, the Court decided five cases originating in Los Angeles County, three in Riverside, two apiece in Orange, Madera and San Joaquin counties, and one each in Alameda, Stanislaus, San Diego, San Bernardino, Santa Clara, Shasta, Monterey, Tulare, Marin and Tehama counties.  In 2017, the Court has to date decided three death penalty cases from Los Angeles, and one each from Alameda, Orange, Fresno and Kings counties.

Join us back here tomorrow as we address the second half of our question: whether any state’s death penalty appeals had an unusually high or low affirmance rate?

Image courtesy of Flickr by Stellbee (no changes).