Does It Take More Pages to Reverse Than to Affirm in Criminal Cases (2004-2018)?

We’ve established already that majority opinions in cases reversing the Court of Appeal are, on average, generally longer than majority opinions affirming.  Last time, we showed that for criminal cases between 1990 and 2003, the result was flipped – affirmances were nearly always longer.  Today, we’re reviewing the data for the years 2004 to 2018.

In Table 741, we report the data for the years 2004 to 2010.  As you can see, affirmances were longer than reversals in every year – in most cases, substantially longer.  In 2004, affirmances averaged 39 pages, while reversals were only 25 pages.  In 2005, affirmances averaged 55.5 pages and reversals were 27.04.  In 2006, affirmances were 60.73 pages, but reversals were 28.93 pages.  In 2007, affirmances averaged 42.56 pages, but reversals were only 28.23.  In 2008, affirmances averaged 46.5 pages, while reversals were 36.04 pages.  In 2009, affirmances averaged 50.27 pages, while reversals were only 23.88 pages.  In 2010, affirmances averaged 54.41 pages, and reversals were 24.16.

Between 2011 and 2018, affirming majority opinions in criminal cases were longer than reversals every year.  In 2011, affirmances averaged 53.79 pages to 24.44 pages for reversals.  In 2012, affirmances were 49.65 pages to 29.19 for reversals.  In 2013, affirmances were 64.27 pages, while reversals were only 27.96 pages.  In 2014, affirmances averaged 50.3 pages, while reversals were 44.96 pages.  In 2015, affirmances averaged 39.68 pages.  Reversals averaged 37.13 pages.  In 2016, affirmances averaged 52.39 pages, and reversals averaged 41.48 pages.  In 2017, affirmances averaged 39.73 pages.  Reversals were 20.42 pages.  In 2018, affirmances averaged 43.38 pages, while reversals were, on average, 37.61 pages.

Join us back here next Thursday as we turn our attention to a new topic.

Image courtesy of Flickr by Darron Birgenheier (no changes).

Does It Take More Pages to Reverse Than to Affirm in Criminal Cases (1990-2003)?

Last time, we asked whether majority opinions in civil cases, on average, tend to be longer when the Court reverses than when it affirms.  The answer was, in the vast majority of cases, yes.  Today and tomorrow, we’re asking the same question in criminal cases.  Surprisingly, the answer for criminal cases is the reverse – affirmances tend to be longer – usually by a wide margin.

Between 1990 and 1996, reversals were longer in only one of seven years.  In 1990, affirmances averaged 27.65 pages and reversals averaged 24.06 pages.  In 1991, affirmances were 31.95 pages.  Reversals averaged 30.52.  In 1992, there was almost no difference – reversals were 40.69 pages and affirmances were 40.66 pages.  In 1993, affirmances averaged 42.52 pages and reversals were only 18.28 pages.  In 1994, affirmances averaged 33.48 pages and reversals 20.75.  In 1995, affirmances averaged 46.5 pages and reversals were 22.7.  In 1996, affirmances averaged 43.36 pages.  Reversals averaged only 32 pages.

Between 1997 and 2003, affirmances were always much longer than majority opinions reversing.  IN 1997, affirmances averaged 58.67 pages and reversals only 20.96 pages.  In 1998, affirmances were 49.32 pages and reversals were 29.59.  In 1999, affirmances averaged 44.3 pages to 19.16 for reversals.  In 2000, affirmances averaged 43.29 pages and reversals averaged 19.24 pages.  IN 2001, affirmances were 38.46 pages to 17.72 for reversals.  In 2002, affirmances were 40.8 pages and reversals were 26.38 pages.  In 2003, affirmances averaged 39.76 pages.  Reversals were 24.96 pages.

Join us back here tomorrow as we review the data for the years 2004 to 2018.

Image courtesy of Flickr by Becky Matsubara (no changes).

Does It Take More Pages to Reverse Than to Affirm in Civil Cases (2004-2018)?

Last time, we compared the length of majority opinions at the Court in civil cases for reversals and affirmances between 1990 and 2003.  In this post, we’re looking at the years 2004 through 2018.

Between 2004 and 2010, in five of seven years reversals averaged longer majority opinions than affirmances.  In 2004, reversals averaged 24.39 pages to 20.25 for affirmances.  In 2005, reversals averaged 24.62 pages and affirmances averaged 22.38 pages.  In 2006, reversals averaged 28 pages; affirmances averaged 22.67 pages.  The following year, reversals averaged 24.79 pages, while affirmances ran 21.6 pages.  In 2008, reversals averaged 28.54 pages.  Affirmances were 22.67 pages.  In 2009, affirmances averaged 25.83 pages, while reversals averaged 22.52.  In 2010, affirmances averaged 30 pages, while reversals were 23.87 pages.

We report the most recent data in Table 738.  In five of eight years, civil reversals were longer on average than affirmances.  In 2011, affirmances averaged 23.5 pages to 22.56 for reversals.  IN 2012, reversals were 27.32 pages, while affirmances averaged 22.33 pages.  In 2013, affirmances averaged 27.57 pages.  Reversals averaged 25.67 pages.  In 2014, affirmances averaged 31.7 pages.  Reversals averaged 23.91.  In 2015, majorities reversing averaged 27.78 pages, while affirmances were 27.44.  In 2016, reversals averaged 26.95 pages, while affirmances were 23.64 pages.  In 2017, reversals averaged 24.61 pages, and affirmances were 23.29.  In 2018, reversals averaged 29.87 pages, while affirmances were 25.71.

Join us back here next week as we turn our attention to the Court’s criminal docket.

Image courtesy of Flickr by LocoSteve (no changes).

Does It Take More Pages to Reverse Than to Affirm in Civil Cases (1990-2003)?

For the past few weeks, we’ve been tracking the Court’s history in terms of the length of their opinions – majority opinions, concurrences and dissents.  Today, we’re looking at a related question – is there a relationship between the length of the opinion and the result – are affirmances or reversals consistently longer?  One can imagine either result – if more or less complex facts or law drive the opinion, then there should be no consistent relationship between length and result.  On the other hand, one might speculate that a healthy collegiality and respect for the Court of Appeal might lead to the expectation that it should take a few more pages to reverse than to affirm.

We report the data in Table 735 – the average length of majority opinions in civil cases reversing (in blue) versus majorities affirming (in red).  In five of seven years between 1990 and 1996, reversals averaged more pages.  In 1990, reversals averaged 18.25 pages to 17.09 for civil affirmances.  In 1991, reversals averaged 18.07 pages to 16.46 pages for affirmances.  In 1992, reversals averaged 19.08 pages, while affirmances averaged 18.94 pages.  In 1993, reversals averaged 17.94 pages to 15.54 pages for affirmances.  In 1994, affirmances were longer – 23.69 pages to 22.89 for reversals.  In 1995, the gap widened – 27.07 pages for affirmances versus 18.73 pages for reversals.  In 1996, reversals averaged 28.65 pages, while affirmances averaged 28 pages.

Once again, between 1997 and 2003, reversals averaged longer opinions in five of seven years.  In 1997, majority opinions reversing averaged 29.53 pages, while affirmances averaged 24.17 pages.  In 1998, reversals averaged 28.12 pages to 23.89 for affirmances.  In 1999, affirmances were 26.38 pages; reversals were 23.9 pages.  In 2000, reversals averaged 26.89 pages to 20.4 for affirmances.  In 2001, affirmances were 25.26 pages, but reversals were 23.65 pages.  In 2002, reversals averaged 22.76 pages in civil cases to 17.74 pages for affirmances.  In 2003, reversals averaged 24.03 pages.  Affirmances averaged 18.92 pages.

Join us back here next time as we review the data for 2004 through 2018.

Image courtesy of Flickr by Ken Lund (no changes).

 

How Has the Length of the Court’s Opinions in Criminal Cases Changed Over Time (Part 2)?

Yesterday, we began our review of the year-to-year average length of the Court’s opinions in criminal cases – majority opinions, concurrences and dissents, beginning with the years 1990 to 2003.  Today, we’re looking at the years 2004 through 2017.

Across the entire fourteen-year period, there is some evidence that majority opinions have edged a bit upwards in average length.  Although majority opinions averaged only 32.86 pages in 2004, they averaged 44.12 in 2005, 44.53 in 206, 42.38 in 2008 and 43.45 pages in 2010.  In 2013, the average majority opinion was 46.54 pages.  In 2014, it rose to 47.93 pages.  Although the average majority was 46.31 pages in 2016, it dropped to 30.78 pages in 2017.

Concurrences seemed to be getting a bit longer between 2004 and 2017.  In 2004, the average criminal concurrence was 2.8 pages.  In 2006, it was even lower: 2.38 pages.  In 2013, the average jumped to 8.35 pages.  After a one-year drop, it was at 7 pages in 2015 and 6.33 pages in 2016, before dropping further to 5.4 pages in 2017.

With only a few outliers, dissents in criminal cases varied along a small band from 2004 to about 2013 – generally between roughly nine and twelve pages.  In the few years since, there is some indication that dissents might be getting longer.  The average dissent was 18.09 pages in 2014 and 14.14 pages in 2015.  Although it dropped to 6.6 pages in 2016, it rose back to 16.56 pages in 2017.

Although the average total length of all criminal opinions was increasing from 1990 to 1995, the numbers were relatively consistent from 1996 to 2009 – each year, the average criminal cases produced somewhere from the high forties to mid fifties’ pages of opinions, with no sustained trends upwards or downwards.  In 2012, a spike began, with the average rising to 57.83, followed by 65.71 pages in 2013 and 70.02 pages in 2014.  The average decreased to 59.4 pages in 2015 and 59.24 pages in 2016, before falling back to 52.74 pages in 2017, a number more consistent with the long-term trend.

We concluded last week by calculating the correlation between the yearly averages for majority opinions, concurrences and dissents – in other words, all things being equal, does a longer dissent tend to mean a longer majority opinion?  For criminal cases, there is a relationship between types of opinions, but only a relatively weak one.  The correlation between majority opinions and dissents is 0.3497.  The relationship between majorities and concurrences is a bit stronger, but not substantially so – 0.4419.  Therefore, a longer dissent or concurrence is only a weak-to-middling indication that the majority opinion will be longer.

One final question – is there any correlation between the year-by-year averages for civil and criminal majority opinions?  As we said on the Illinois Supreme Court Review earlier this week, for a variety of reasons, one would expect the answer to be no: civil and criminal are very different areas of law, every case has its own level of complexity, issues, facts, etc.

But in fact, the length of opinions on the one side of the docket is a fairly good predictor of the length of opinions for cases on the other side of the docket.  The correlation between majority opinions in civil and criminal cases from 1990 to 2017 is 0.59472 – moderately high.  The correlation between civil and criminal dissents was nearly as high: 0.527664.  Even the correlation between civil and criminal concurring opinions was moderately high: 0.454033.  As for why that might be, we’ll have to leave that for a future post.

Join us back here next Thursday as we turn to a new area.

Image courtesy of Flickr by Mike Baird (no changes).

How Has the Length of the Court’s Opinions in Criminal Cases Changed Over Time (Part 1)?

Last week, we reviewed the year-by-year data on the length of the Court’s opinions in civil cases – majorities, concurrences and dissents.  We were looking at two questions: first, are opinions getting longer (or shorter) over time, and second, is there a relationship between longer dissents and longer majorities?  This week, we’re looking at the criminal docket, beginning today with the years 1990 to 2003.

Because this dataset includes all the Court’s criminal cases, including death penalty cases, we would expect the average majority opinion to be significantly longer than the average in civil cases, and in fact, it is.  That said, there was no consistent trend upwards or downwards; about all we can say is that the average majority opinion was in the thirties or forties during these years.  Only three years were outside that range: 1990 (26.24 pages), 1994 (27.27 pages) and 2001 (29.52 pages).

Concurrences varied along a very small band too.  Between 1990 and 1995, the average concurrence was between one and a half and two and a half pages.  Between 1997 and 2003, the average bounced around between a low of 3.12 pages (1997) and a high of 4.64 pages (1998).

Dissents were a bit more unpredictable, but not much.  After remaining fairly flat between the high fours and low sevens from 1990 to 1995, the average dissent jumped to 10.74 pages in 1996.  From there until 2003, the increase largely held – 9.46 in 1997, 10.93 in 1998, a small dip from 1999 to 2001, then 9.11 in 2002 and 9.18 in 2003.

In Table 732, we report the average total pages of opinions per criminal case.  The average was in the thirties in 1990-1991 and 1993-1994, spiking to 49.73 in 1992.  In the years 1996 to 1998, there was a three year significant increase, to 54.99 in 1996, 51.97 pages in 1997 and 57.44 in 1998.  From that year until 2003, the average nosed back down into the forties: 43.42 pages in 1999, 45.78 pages in 2000, 45.95 pages in 2002 and 46.3 pages in 2003.

Join us back here tomorrow as we turn our attention to the years 2004 through 2017.

Image courtesy of Flickr by Anita Ritenour (no changes).

How Has the Length of the Court’s Opinions in Civil Cases Evolved Over Time (Part 2)?

Yesterday, we reviewed the average length of the Court’s opinions – majorities, concurrences and dissents – for the years 1990 through 2003.  Today, we’re bringing the numbers up to the present day.

We noted yesterday that majority opinions seemed to have gotten slightly longer on average for the years 1990 through 2003.  For the years 2004 through 2017, majorities held steady at around the level they found in the second half of the earlier period.  Between 2004 and 2007, the average majority opinion was between twenty-two and twenty-six pages.  Between 2012 and 2016, the average was between twenty-six and twenty-eight pages.  The average majority opinion last year was 23.81 pages.

Concurrences – typically a very small data set in any given year – have not followed any consistent trend.  The average concurrence reached 5.2 pages in 2006 and 5.54 in 2009 before tailing off again in 2010 and 2011. In 2012, the average concurrence was 9.29 pages.  In 2014 and 2015, the average concurrence stayed above seven pages (7.88 and 7.22).  After a one-year anomalous spike in 2016, the average settled back down to 4.25 pages in 2017.

Dissents are clearly getting longer.  For the years 2004-2006, the average stayed steady – 9.78 pages, 9.85 pages and 8.82 pages, but beginning in 2010 (13.78 pages), the average began climbing – 16.5 pages in 2011, 10 pages in 2012, 12.56 pages in 2013, 13.57 pages in 2014, 12 pages in 2015, 13 pages in 2016 and 18.1 pages in 2017.

Is the average total page output of opinions per case increasing?  The answer is an unequivocal yes.  Between 2004 and 2009, the number was relatively steady – between thirty-five and forty every year except 2008.  But since then, the average output has been rising: 43.3 pages in 2010, 44.82 in 2011, 47.21 in 2012, 44.26 in 2013, 48.84 in 2014, 46.91 in 2015, 58.51 in 2016 and 46.16 in 2017.

So, final question: how highly correlated are the long-term trends in majority opinions, concurrences and dissents?  In other words – do longer majorities drive length in dissents, or vice versa?  (If the answer seems obvious, it isn’t, necessarily – earlier this week, we showed that majorities and dissents are only moderately correlated for that Court, and majorities and concurrences are almost entirely unrelated).

The answer for California is that there is at least moderately strong evidence that length in dissents and concurrences helps drive longer majorities.  For the entire period, the correlation between majorities and dissents is 0.561, and the correlation between majorities and concurrences in 0.415.  Has that result been consistent for the entire twenty-eight years?  Surprisingly, the answer is no.  For the years 2004 to 2017, dissents have had almost no influence on majorities at all – the correlation is only 0.0009.  There’s a moderate correlation between majority opinions and concurrences – 0.4011.  For the first half of the period – the years 1990 to 2003 – both correlations were significantly higher.  The correlation between majority opinions and dissents was 0.7964 – a very high number.  The correlation between majority opinions and concurrences was 0.5451.

Join us back here next week as we turn our attention to the Court’s criminal docket.

Image courtesy of Flickr by Damian Gadal (no changes).

How Has the Length of the Court’s Opinions in Civil Cases Evolved Over Time (Part 1)?

This week, we’re turning our attention to a new subject – how has the average length of the Court’s majority, concurring and dissenting opinions in civil cases changed between 1990 and 2017?  In studying the numbers, we’re looking for evidence on two points: are opinions getting consistently longer or shorter, whether because of the evolution of the docket, changes in judicial style or changes in the members of the Court, and whether longer dissents (or concurrences) tend to drive longer majorities (or vice versa).  Today, we’re reviewing the civil docket between 1990 and 2003.  Tomorrow, we’ll look at the years 2004 to 2017.

We chart the data for majority opinions, concurrences and dissents in civil cases between 1990 and 2003 in Table 727 below.  Majority opinions were slowly getting longer during these years.  After four straight years between seventeen and nineteen pages 1990-1993, the average increased to 23.14 in 1994 and 28.43 in 1996.  In the seven years after that, majorities got a bit shorter, but never returned to the 1990-1993 level.  In 1998, the average civil majority was 25.96 pages, it was between twenty-four and twenty-five in 1999 and 2000, fell to 20.29 in 2002, but recovered to 22.75 in 2003.

Concurrences, on the other hand, were not following any consistent trend.  The average civil concurrence was 6.14 pages in 1991, before dropping to 4 in 1992, 2.25 in 1993 and 2.1 in 1994.  By 1996, the average had recovered back to 6.45 in 1996, 6 in 1997, 6.27 in 1998 and 7.43 in 1999.  Then it dipped again, reaching three pages in 2001, before recovering to 4 pages in 2002 and 5.22 in 2003.

Dissents got noticeably longer during this fourteen year period.  The average civil dissent was between six and eight pages between 1990 and 1993, but it increased to 8.94 in 1994, 11 (1995), 13 (1996) and 13.5 (1997).  The average dipped to 9.17 in 1998 but rose quickly back to its trend line – 12.52 in 1999 and 2000, 11.35 in 2001, 10 in 2002 and 13.7 pages in 2003.

Given that both majority opinions and dissents seemed to be slowly getting longer between 1990 and 2003, we would expect the total output of opinion pages – majorities, concurrences and dissents – to be trending upward too.  And it definitely was.  In 1990, the average civil case required 28.04 pages of opinions to decide.  By 1994 and 1995, that number was in the thirties (34.18 and 37.16, respectively).  By 1996, the average civil case was 47.88 pages.  The number fell briefly into the thirties again in 2001 and 2002 (38.31 pages in 2001 and 34.29 pages in 2002), before increasing to 41.67 pages in 2003.

Join us back here tomorrow as we address the civil docket for the years 2004 through 2017.

Image courtesy of Flickr by Jeff Turner (no changes).

What District/Division of the Court of Appeal Averaged the Most Votes to Affirm Before the Supreme Court in Criminal Cases (Part 2)?

Yesterday, we reviewed average votes to affirm in criminal cases for the First District’s Divisions and the first five Divisions of the Second District.  Today, we’re reviewing the data for the rest of the state.

Division Six of the Second District had a votes to affirm of four or more in only three years (1998, 2010 and 2012).  Votes to affirm was between three and four votes in another three years (2000, 2004 and 2007).  Votes to affirm was between zero and two in twelve years (1993, 1995-1996, 2001-2002, 2006, 2008-2009, 2013-2015 and 2017).  The Supreme Court decided no cases from Division Six in eight years (1990-1992, 1994, 1997, 2003, 2005 and 2016).

Division Seven did somewhat better.  Votes to affirm was at four or more in six years (1992, 1994-1996, 2002 and 2006).  Votes to affirm was between three and four in two years (2001 and 2005).  Votes to affirm was between zero and two in nine years (1991, 1998-2000, 2003-2004, 2007, 2009 and 2013).  The Supreme Court decided no cases from Division Seven in nine years (1990, 1993, 1997, 2010-2012 and 2015-2017).

In the seventeen years since the creation of Division Eight, votes to affirm was at four or more in only two years (2013 and 2017).  Votes to affirm was between three and four only in 2007.  Votes to affirm was between zero and two in seven years (2005-2006, 2009-2012, 2014 and 2016).  The Supreme Court decided no cases from Division Eight in seven years (2000-2004, 2008 and 2015).

The Third District had votes to affirm of four or more in nine years (1992, 1997-1998, 2001-2003, 2008, 2010 and 2013).  Votes to affirm was between three and four in six years (1994, 2009, 2011-2012, 2014 and 2017).  Votes to affirm was between zero and two in six years (1991, 1993, 1995, 2000, 2007 and 2015).  The Supreme Court decided no cases from the Third District in two years (1990 and 1996).

Division One of the Fourth District had a votes to affirm of four or more in seven years (1995-1996, 1998, 2000, 2003, 2009 and 2015).  Votes to affirm was between three and four in five years (1993, 2004-2005, 2008 and 2016).  The Supreme Court decided no criminal cases from Division One in three years (1991, 2001 and 2006).

Division Two of the Fourth District had votes to affirm of four or more in seven years (1992, 1996, 1998, 2003, 2005 and 2009-2010).  Votes to affirm was between three and four in eight years (1993, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2004, 2007-2008 and 2012).  Votes to affirm was between zero and two in eight years (1990-1991, 1995, 2006, 2011 and 2013-2015).  The Supreme Court decided no criminal cases from Division Two in three years (2000, 2002 and 2016).

Division Three of the Fourth District has had a relatively low votes to affirm in criminal cases since 1990.  The rate was at four or more in only five years (1994, 2005, 2007, 2011 and 2017).  Votes to affirm was between three and four in five years (2000, 2008 and 2014-2016).  Votes to affirm was between zero and two in ten years (1992-1993, 1995, 1997-1998, 2002-2004, 2006 and 2012-2013).  The Supreme Court decided no criminal cases from Division Three in three years (1990, 1996 and 2009).

Votes to affirm for criminal cases from the Fifth District has been at four or more in nine years (1990-1992, 1998, 2001, 2004, 2008, 2011 and 2013).  Votes to affirm was between three and four three times (2003, 2005 and 2009).  Votes to affirm was between zero and two eight times (1997, 1999-2000, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2012 and 2017).  The Supreme Court decided no criminal cases from the Fifth District in only three years (2014-2016).

The Sixth District’s votes to affirm in criminal cases has been at four or more in seven years since 1990 (1991, 1997, 1999-2001, 2007 and 2017).  Votes to affirm was between three and four six times (1990, 1993, 2008-2009 and 2011-2012).  Votes to affirm was between zero and two thirteen times (1994-1996, 1998, 2002-2005, 2010, 2013-2014 and 2016).

Finally, we turn to the Court’s criminal cases taken directly from the Superior Court – almost exclusively death penalty appeals.  Average votes to affirm in direct criminal appeals has been at four or more votes every year since 1990 save two: 1996 (3.79) and 2015 (3.94).  Votes to affirm was between six and seven in five years, between five and six twelve times and between four and five nine times during this period.

Join us back here next Thursday as we begin work on a new topic – and Happy Holidays to all!

Image courtesy of Flickr by Becky Matsubara (no changes).

What District/Division of the Court of Appeal Averaged the Most Votes to Affirm Before the Supreme Court in Criminal Cases (Part 1)?

Last week, we delved more deeply into how each District and Division of the Court of Appeal has fared before the Supreme Court, reviewing the yearly average votes to affirm each court’s decision in civil cases.  This week, we’re reviewing the numbers for criminal cases from 1990 to 2017.

Division One of the First District had a votes to affirm rate of four or more in nine years (1996-1997, 1999-2000, 2005, 2007-2008, 2014 and 2017).  The rate was between three and four in two years (1993 and 1998).  Votes to affirm were between zero and two in one year (2004).  The Supreme Court heard no cases from Division One in sixteen years (1990-1992, 1994-1995, 2001-2003, 2006, 2009-2013 and 2015-2016).

Division Two of the First District had votes to affirm of four or more in five years (1995, 2001, 2008 and 2014-2015).  Votes to affirm was between three and four in one year (2002).  Votes to affirm was between zero and two in eleven years (1992, 1996-1997, 1999, 2003, 2005-2007 and 2009-2011).  The Supreme Court decided no cases from Division Two in nine years (1990-1991, 1993-1994, 1998, 2004, 2013 and 2016-2017).

Division Three of the First District fared well most years in criminal cases.  Since 1990, the court has posted a votes to affirm of four or more in nine years (1994, 1998-1999, 2001-2002, 2004, 2006, 2009 and 2015).  Votes to affirm was between three and four in three years (1995, 2005 and 2014).  Votes to affirm was between zero and two in five years (1993, 1996-1997 and 2016-2017).  The Supreme Court decided no criminal cases from Division Three in eleven years of our study period (1990-1992, 2000, 2003, 2007-2008 and 2010-2013).

The average votes to affirm for Division Four has clustered on opposite sides of the spectrum.  In seven years, votes to affirm averaged four or more (1991, 1995-1996, 2004, 2009, 2012 and 2015).  In only one year was votes to affirm between three and four – 2002.  In seven years, votes to affirm was between zero and two (1990, 1992, 1997, 2001, 2005-2006 and 2013.)  In thirteen years, the Supreme Court has decided no criminal cases from Division Four (1993-1994, 1998-2000, 2003, 2007-2008, 2010-2011, 2014 and 2016-2017).

Division Five of the First District has had a votes to affirm in criminal cases of four or more in six of the past twenty-eight years (1994, 1998, 2001, 2010 and 2014).  Votes to affirm has been between three and four in four years (1993, 2003, 2004 and 2006).  Votes to affirm has been between zero and two in nine years (1990, 1992, 1995-1996, 1999, 2002, 2008, 2012 and 2015).  The Supreme Court has decided no criminal cases from Division Five in nine years (1991, 1997, 2005, 2007, 2009, 2011 and 2016-2017).

District One of the Second District has tended to have lower votes to affirm in criminal cases. Votes to affirm was four or more in only three years (2011, 2013 and 2015).  The rate was between three and four in two years (1998 and 2012).  Votes to affirm were between zero and two in twelve years (1994-1997, 1999-2000, 2002-2004, 2008, 2010 and 2016).  The Supreme Court decided no criminal cases from Division One in ten years (1990-1992, 2001, 2005-2007, 2009, 2014 and 2017).

Division Two of the Second District had a votes to affirm of four or more in eight years (1996, 1998-1999, 2001-2002, 2007, 2014 and 2017).  Votes to affirm were not between three and four in any year.  Votes to affirm was between zero and two in seven years (1994, 1997, 2000, 2005-2006, 2009 and 2015).  The Supreme Court decided no criminal cases from Division Two in thirteen years (1990-1993, 1995, 2003-2004, 2008, 2010-2013 and 2016).

Division Three of the Second District had a votes to affirm of four or more in eight years (1994, 1996, 2000, 2003-2004, 2012, and 2014-2015).  Votes to affirm was between three and four in three years (1997 and 2001-2002).  Votes to affirm were between zero and two in four years (1995, 1999, 2008 and 2016).  The Supreme Court decided no cases from Division Three in eleven years (1990-1993, 1998, 2005, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2013 and 2017).

Division Four of the Second District had a votes to affirm of four or more in seven years (1997-1999, 2002-2003 and 2007-2008).  Votes to affirm was between three and four in two years (2001 and 2005).  Votes to affirm was between zero and two in five years (2000, 2009, 2013-2014 and 2017).  The Supreme Court decided no cases from Division Four in thirteen years (1990-1996, 2004, 2006, 2010-2011 and 2015-2016).

Division Five of the Second District had a votes to affirm of four or more in six years (1995, 1998, 2008, 2011-2012 and 2017).  Votes to affirm was between three and four in three years (2001-2002 and 2016).  Votes to affirm was between zero and two in eight years (1997, 2000, 2004-2005, 2009-2010 and 2013-2014).  The Supreme Court decided no cases from Division Five in nine years (1990-=1991, 1994, 1996, 1999, 2003, 2006-2007 and 2015.

Join us back here tomorrow as we review the data for the rest of the state.

Image courtesy of Flickr by Ed Bierman (no changes).

LexBlog