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Kirk Jenkins brings a wealth of experience to his appellate practice, which focuses on antitrust and constitutional law, as well as products liability, RICO, price fixing, information sharing among competitors and class certification. In addition to handling appeals, he also regularly works with trial teams to ensure that important issues are properly presented and preserved for appellate review.  Mr. Jenkins is a pioneer in the application of data analytics to appellate decision-making and writes two analytics blogs, the California Supreme Court Review and the Illinois Supreme Court Review, as well as regularly writing for various legal publications.

Today, we’re dissecting the reversal rate in criminal cases from Division 1 of the Second District.  The following areas of law were the biggest players on the criminal docket in terms of cases which went to the Supreme Court: constitutional law (23.53%); criminal procedure (20.59%); sentencing (14.71%); and violent crimes (11.76%).

The overall reversal rate

Last time, we reviewed reversal rates in criminal cases from the Divisions of Los Angeles’ Second District.  Today, we’re looking at the rest of the state – San Francisco’s First District, Divisions One through Five, the Third District, District Four, Divisions One, Two and Three, and the Fifth and Sixth Districts.

Division 2 of the

This time, we’re reviewing the reversal rates in civil cases from 1990 to 2020 for the areas of California outside of Los Angeles’ Second District – the First District (San Francisco) and the Third, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Districts.

Division 4 of the First District had the worst reversal rate in this group – 74.07%. 

This week, we’re beginning a detailed look at the reversal rates, District by District and Division by Division, for the Court of Appeal in the Supreme Court.  First up, reversal rates for Los Angeles’ Second District.

Between 1990 and 2020, Division Four of the Second District had the highest reversal rate at 68.18%.  Division One

This time, we’re comparing the lag time from grant to decision in criminal cases to the ultimate case result.  In order not to bias the data, we begin by eliminating the death penalty and habeas corpus cases, where the determinants of lag time are quite different than non-death criminal cases.

Once again, there is a

Last time, we reviewed the Court’s civil cases, asking whether divided decisions from the Court of Appeal were more likely to be reversed in whole or in part than unanimous ones.  This time, we’re turning our attention to the criminal cases and finding a very different result.

In only four of the past thirty-one years